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Abstract
This paper analyzes the stability of monetary regimes in an economy where fiat money is
endogenously created by the government, information about its value is imperfect, and learning
is decentralized. We show that monetary stability depends crucially on the speed of information
transmission in the economy. Our model generates a dynamic on the acceptability of fiat money
that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual collapse of overissued paper money.
It also provides an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread
use of fiat money is only a recent development.
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evolution was completed, the use of paper money was, in each case, eventually abandoned. This abandonment
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(Gordon Tullock, 1957)
∗We are specially grateful to Randall Wright and George Mailath. We also benefited from conversations with
Jan Eeckhout, Brett Norwood, Dan Silverman and Brandon Weber. Seminar participants at Cornell, Georgetown,
Michigan State, Penn, Purdue, Texas-Austin, the 2002 NSF Decentralization Conference, the 2002 SED Meeting
and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland provided many comments and suggestions. Corresponding author: Luis
Araujo, 101 Marshall-Adams Hall, Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-
1038. E-mail: araujolu@msu.edu.
1
1 Introduction
In recent years, a large body of work has been devoted to the study of economies where the value of
money arises endogenously. Most of the literature, following Kyotaki and Wright (KW hereafter)
(1989, 1993), takes as a starting point the assumption that the amount of money in circulation, be
it known or not, fixed or changing over time, is exogenously given. Less attention has been given to
the questions that arise when we allow the quantity of money to be endogenous; i.e., when we make
some of the agents inside the economy responsible for money creation. Of particular importance
is the emergence and stability of fiat money regimes. One of the few contributions in this front
is Ritter (1995), where the transition from a barter to a fiat money economy is analyzed.1 He
considers an economy where a coalition of agents, that he identifies as the government, is allowed
to issue money, and shows that in order for this transition to take place, the size and the patience
of this coalition must be large. Patience is important because the government must care about the
future if money is to have value. Size plays a role as it allows the government to internalize the
costs of overissue.
While providing a framework where the emergence of fiat money occurs endogenously, Ritter
does not address the concomitant issue of its stability, i.e., whether money remains in circulation in
the long-run or not. In his framework, once fiat money is introduced, it always stays in the economy.
There is, however, varied evidence, as we can see in the above excerpt from Tullock (1957), that
paper money issued by governments was, in the past, subject to much instability. Yang (1952),
in his study of money in ancient China also describes a succession of failures in the transition to
paper money due to instabilities related to overissue. A similar pattern of overissue and consequent
abandonment of paper money appears throughout the U.S. history, as can be seen in Galbraith’s
(1975) account of the monetary experience in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1690 and in various
American colonies during the mid-18th century. The rise and the collapse of paper money seems
to be such a common phenomenon throughout history that, according to Friedman and Schwartz
(1986), a continuous and widespread use of fiat money is only a twentieth century development.
In what follows, we build a model where monetary stability depends on both exogenous and
endogenous factors. We take a simplified version of KW (1989) as our starting point. The main
difference from KW is that the amount m of money in circulation is determined by a self-interested
agent, the government, and is not known in advance by the other agents in the economy. We
refer to the value of m as the monetary regime. These agents can react against the government
by not accepting money if they think its value is low. Agents can obtain information about m
from the trade meetings in which they participate; that is, from their private histories. Hence, the
1See also Sik Kim (2001) and Norwood (2003).
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same technology that governs trade and makes money essential in our environment, random and
anonymous pairwise meetings, is also used to describe the transmission of information. Related
papers in the literature always assume that there is a time when the quantity of money in circulation
is revealed to all agents.2
The exogenous factors affecting the stability of money are the government’s patience and the
speed of information transmission. The endogenous factor comes from the ability the agents have
to over time learn the nature of the monetary regime. In an environment where learning happens
slowly, an impatient government can exploit the agents’ misinformation and overissue, while main-
taining the value of money in the short-run. Agents eventually realize the government’s actual
behavior and monetary trade breaks down. However, it takes time until a complete breakdown of
trade happens, a result that matches with Tullock’s observation on the history of paper money in
China. In this case, monetary stability is only feasible with a patient government. On the contrary,
when agents accumulate a lot of information in a short period of time, even impatient governments
prefer not to overissue in order to avoid the breakdown of monetary trade.
Our model then provides an informational rationale for the late emergence of fiat money. Soci-
eties’ ability to gather information and learn about the state of the economy increased over time.
In modern economies, the dissemination of information is much faster than in the past, and so a
government’s temptation to overissue should be less pronounced. Therefore, the late widespread
implementation of fiat money is not necessarily a result of exogenous factors like an increase in the
government size and patience. It can, instead, be the result of an increase in the society’s ability
to monitor the behavior of the money issuer.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section the environment is described. In Section
3 the agents’ problem is solved. Section 4 describes the dynamics of the economy under distinct
monetary regimes and solves the government’s problem. Section 5 discusses how changes in the
degree of information transmission affect the behavior of the government. Section 6 deals with
existence and characterization of equilibria of the game between the agents and the government.
In Section 7 some remarks about our modeling assumptions are made. Section 8 concludes. An
appendix collects all proofs.
2That is the case, for example, in Wallace (1997) and Katzman, Kennan, and Wallace (2003). Outside the money
literature, Wolinsky (1990) is the closest to our paper in how the transmission of information is modeled. A key
difference, and something that plays a central role in our analysis, is that we parameterize the speed of information
transmission in our environment by allowing the number of meetings per unit of time to change.
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2 The Model
We have a discrete time economy populated with one large infinitely lived agent, that we call
the government, and a [0, 1] continuum of small infinitely lived agents. The discount factor of
the government, denoted by δ, is its private information and is determined by a draw from a
distribution function F with p.d.f. f and support [0, 1]. The discount factor of each small agent is
an independent draw from a distribution function G with a p.d.f. g. We assume the support of G
is [β, β], with 1 < β < β < 1.
Throughout the paper we refer to the small agents simply as agents. They are of K > 2 different
types, each one corresponding to one of the K possible types of goods that can be produced in
this economy. Goods are indivisible and perishable, i.e., they only last for one period. An agent of
type k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} only derives utility from consuming a good of type k, with each unit consumed
yielding utility u > 0. Moreover, a type k agent can only be endowed with a type k + 1( mod K)
good, that we call his endowment good. The distribution of agent types across the population is
uniform. In other words, for any type k, the fraction of the population that is of this type is 1K .
At the beginning of every period, all agents receive one unit of their endowment good. They then
have two alternatives, either go to the market, where trade is possible, or stay in autarky. If an
agent stays in autarky, he receives some flow utility a. We discuss a below.
The government can neither produce nor consume any of the K goods that are available in
the economy. It has, however, the technology to print indivisible fiat money and store goods over
time, with the latter being the source of its utility. With this, we aim at capturing the idea
that the government derives utility from seigniorage, i.e., the revenue from money issue. We are
going to be precise about how the government derives utility at the end of this section. The way
the government obtains goods for storage is the following: In any given period, after the agents
have made their market-autarky decisions, but before trade starts in the market, the government
approaches a fraction m of the population that entered the market and offers to exchange their
corresponding endowment good for one unit of fiat money. The value of m is restricted to the set
{mL,mH}, with mL < mH , but no agent in the economy observes the government’s choice.
The market is organized as follows. We have K distinct sectors, each one specialized in the
exchange of one of the K possible goods. Agents can identify sectors, but inside each one of them
they are pairwise matched under an uniform random matching technology.3 Since K > 2, there are
no double coincidence of wants meetings. An agent, however, can trade his endowment for money
3We adopt this particular market structure for simplicity. As we show in the next section, it delivers a simple
expression for the value functions within a period. The results do not change under a more general specification for
the meeting technology.
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and use money to buy the good he likes. More precisely, if an agent wants money, he goes to the
sector that trades his endowment and searches for an agent with money. If he has money, he goes
to the sector that trades the good he likes and searches for an agent with it. As soon as an agent
obtains one unit of the good he likes, he consumes it. After that, he receives one more unit of
his endowment good, that can be used for further trading.4 In every period, anyone going to the
market faces n rounds of meetings, where n > 1 is fixed. If at the end of the last round of market
meetings an agent has money with him, he has two options. He can either attempt to obtain his
endowment good back from the government, or he can keep his money until the next period. If he
obtains his endowment good from the government, he can use it to get utility a < u. Finally, we
assume that agents don’t discount within a trading period.
To summarize, the sequence of actions in this economy in any given period is as follows: (i) At
the beginning of every period each agent decides between staying in autarky or going to the market,
and the government chooses the amount m ∈ {mL,mH} of money it wants to put in circulation;
(ii) If an agent stays in autarky, he obtains utility a; (iii) If instead the agent chooses the market,
he first has the chance (in case he is approached by the government) of exchanging his endowment
for money; (iv) Following that, all agents face n rounds of market meetings; (v) After the last of
these market meetings is over, agents with money can go back to the government and attempt to
exchange their unit of money for their endowment. In the next period, the same process is repeated.
One important assumption that we make about the government’s behavior is that once it chooses
the value of m in the first period, it cannot change it afterwards. In the last section of the paper
we discuss the role of this assumption, and how it affects our results. We say the monetary regime
is soft if m = mH and tight if m = mL.
Notice that in the description of the market, we took the behavior of the agents and the
government as given. It is possible, in a natural way, to model the market environment itself as a
game involving the agents and the government. As the next subsection makes clear, this game has
an equilibrium where: (i) The agents always exchange their endowment for one unit of money if
approached by the government; (ii) The agents’ behavior in the market (sectors to visit and trading
decisions) is as above; (iii) The government always returns the endowment goods if the agents that
can claim them at the end of the trading period do so. Since in this paper we are interested in the
agents’ market/autarky decisions, and in how these interact with the choice of monetary regime by
the government, we omit the above details for the sake of brevity.
4A detailed specification of the production process is not important for our analysis. Hence, we proceed as in KW
(1993) and assume that consumption is the only input necessary for the production of a new endowment.
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2.1 Agents’ Payoffs
We now specify what are the agents’ payoffs in this environment. We begin by describing how
their flow payoffs from entering the market depend on m, the amount of money in circulation. An
implicit assumption in all that follows is that in every period, no matter the nature of the monetary
regime, a positive fraction of the agents enters the market. Otherwise the random matching process
described above does not make sense. In Section 6 we show that there are conditions on the model
parameters that justify this assumption.
Suppose the fraction of money in the economy is m. Let wij indicate the current period expected
payoff of an agent with j units of money right before his ith meeting, where j ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈
{1, ..., n}. Let wn+1j indicate the current period expected payoff of an agent that has j units of
money at the end of the market meetings. Then
wi0(m) = mw
i+1
1 (m) + (1−m)wi+10 (m),
wi1(m) = mw
i+1
1 (m) + (1−m)(u+ wi+10 (m)).
Consider the second equation. An agent with money right before his ith trade opportunity has a
probability m of meeting another agent with money. In this case no trade occurs and he moves
to the next round of meetings with money. With probability (1 −m) he meets an agent without
money, in which case he obtains utility u and moves to the next round of meetings without money.
A similar interpretation holds for the first equation.
Below we are going to determine under what conditions an agent holding money at the end of
the nth market meeting exchanges it for his endowment good. If that is the case, then
wn+10 (m) = w
n+1
1 (m) = a.
We can solve this problem recursively and obtain the current period expected payoff of an agent
right before his first meeting in the market. If we let w0(m) = w10(m) and w1(m) = w
1
1(m), then
w0(m) = a+ (n− 1)m(1−m)u,
w1(m) = a+ (n− 1)m(1−m)u+ (1−m)u.
Notice that w1(m) > w0(m). An agent’s current period expected payoff w(m) from going to the
market as a function of the amount of money in circulation is then equal to
w(m) = (1−m)w0(m) +mw1(m) = a+ nm(1−m)u.
We stated before that the overall gain in autarky in every period is equal to a. We now describe
how this value is obtained. When in autarky, any agent can use his endowment good as an input
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to a production technology. Each unit of endowment good produces one unit of a consumption
good that yields utility a.5 If the agent has more production possibilities, he receives one more
unit of his endowment good. We assume that each round of meetings in the market corresponds
to a production possibility in autarky. Moreover, since an agent that goes to the market has an
additional consumption opportunity at the end of his market meetings, we also give this opportunity
to an agent that stays in autarky. Hence a = (n+ 1)a. Consequently, the payoff gain or loss from
going to the market is equal to
w(m)− (n+ 1)a = nm(1−m)u− na.
Instead of looking at this difference, we look at the payoff gain or loss per unit of market
meetings,
1
n
[w(m)− (n+ 1)a] = m(1−m)u− a.
Denote w(m)/n by v(m). This normalization is useful when we make comparisons between the
market and autarky for distinct choices of n, and when n → ∞. In particular, this difference is
independent of n, the number of market meetings. Therefore, when we study the effect of changes
in n on an agent’s optimal decision, we look at the informational effects only, not to the real effects
that this change has over the flow payoffs.
In this paper we are interested in a situation where an agent’s expected flow payoff from choosing
the market decreases when the fraction of people with money increases. Otherwise, there are
no trade-offs involved when the government decides how much money to issue. Therefore, we
restrict attention to the region of parameters where v(m) decreases with m. This leads to our first
assumption:
Assumption 1 mH > mL ≥ 12 .
Our next assumption states that the values of mH and mL correspond, respectively, to non-
existence and existence of monetary equilibrium under full information. In other words, if agents
know that the government issues mH , they prefer autarky, while if they know the government issues
mL they prefer the market:
Assumption 2 mH(1−mH) < a
u
< mL(1−mL).
Finally, we impose conditions such that an agent ending up with a note at the end of his nth
market meeting wants to exchange it for his endowment.6 In this way we ensure that the fraction
5We can think that this produced good is the type of good that the agent likes, but there is a disutility c = u− a
in producing each unit of it.
6The government is indifferent between keeping the goods or giving them back (as they are perishable). Since
the agent has a gain in receiving the good back, the analysis that follows looks at an efficient equilibrium where the
government always returns the goods.
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of agents in the market that carry money does not change over time. Because an agent can carry
at most one unit of money, we need:
Assumption 3
a
u
> β(1−mL)2.
This ensures that even the most patient agent possible would rather recover his endowment than
increase the probability that he begins the following period with money. Since mL ≥ 12 , we know
that for all β ∈ [0, 1) , β(1−mL)2 < mL(1−mL), and so assumptions 2 and 3 can be both satisfied.
Now that we know the full-information flow payoffs, we can describe payoffs in the incomplete
information case, the case of interest. It is convenient to regard the choice of m by the government
at the start of every period as a meeting for the agents. If m is the choice of money by the
government, then with probability m an agent that enters the market meets the government and
trades his endowment for one unit of fiat money. Therefore, if n is the number of market meetings
in a given period, all agents that enter the market face n + 1 meetings. We refer to these n + 1
meetings as trade meetings.
We begin by introducing some notation. Let θ0 be the common prior belief among all agents
that the monetary regime is soft. A mixed strategy for the government is a function M : [0, 1] →
P{mL,mH} that maps discount factors into probability distributions over the set of possible mon-
etary regimes. If we let MH(δ) be the probability that a government with discount factor δ chooses
a soft monetary regime, then θ0 is given by
θ0 =
∫
[0,1]
MH(δ)f(δ)dδ.
Let Ωt be the set of all possible histories up to period t that an agent can face, and Ω∞ be the
set of all possible infinite histories in this environment. Loosely speaking, an element ht of Ωt is a
list made up of: (i) The agent’s prior belief that m = mH ; (ii) All his previous action choices; (iii)
All his previous good and money holdings; (iv) The good and money holdings of all his previous
trade partners; (v) The outcome of his trade meetings.
Since money and goods are indivisible, they can only be exchanged on a one-to-one basis.
Moreover, in our environment agents hold either one unit of money or one unit of their endowment
good at any point in time. Therefore, the only relevant piece of information for an agent at the
beginning of a period is the record of money holdings of his partners in all his previous trade
meetings. This includes the meetings with the government, where being offered to exchange one’s
endowment for one unit of money is interpreted as the government having one unit of money. Hence
Ω = {0, 1}n+1 ∪ {A} summarizes an agent’s experience in any given period. If he chooses autarky
(A), he observes nothing. If he chooses to enter the market (M), he faces a succession of n + 1
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meetings, his government meeting and the n market meetings. A zero indicates a meeting with an
agent without money, a one a meeting with an agent with money. The set of histories up to period
t is then Ωt = ×t−1τ=1Ω if t > 1 and Ωt = {θ0} if t = 1. The set of all infinite histories an agent can
face in this environment is just Ω∞ = ×∞τ=1Ω.
A behavioral strategy for an agent is a list {st}∞t=1 of functions such that st : Ωt → P{A,M} is
the map describing the agent’s (possibly random) choice of action in period t as a function of his
private history. Here M stands for market and A for autarky.
Let p(M |ht) = st(ht)({M}) and p(A|ht) = st(ht)({A}) denote, respectively, the probabilities
that the market and autarky are chosen after history ht when the behavioral strategy s = {st}∞t=1
is being followed. Let vE(ht) denote the expected flow payoff from entering the market given a
history ht. Then, given the normalization in payoffs introduced above,
ut(ht|s) = p(M |ht)vE(ht) + p(A|ht)(n+ 1)a
n
is the expected flow utility in period t, given ht ∈ Ωt, from playing s. To finish, observe that a
behavioral strategy s, together with an initial prior belief θ0 and a monetary regime m, determine
a probability distribution over Ω∞. Denote this probability distribution by σ(s,m, θ0). Therefore,
if an agent’s discount factor is β, his expected payoff from following s, given θ0, is
V (s|θ0) = (1− β)
{
θ0Eσ(s,mH ,θ0)
[ ∞∑
t=1
βt−1ut(ht|s)
]
+(1− θ0)Eσ(s,mL,θ0)
[ ∞∑
t=1
βt−1ut(ht|s)
]}
.
2.2 The Government’s Payoffs
Let µt(m) be the measure of the population that enters the economy in period t when m is the
amount of money in circulation. This measure is determined by the agents’ behavior and the value
of m. As a consequence of Assumption 3, µt(m)m is the amount of goods that the government
stores during this period. The government’s utility, as a function of its discount factor δ and its
choice of money supply m in the first period, is then given by
U(m, δ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1µt(m)m
if δ < 1. When δ = 1, we take the government’s utility to be given by
U(m, 1) = lim inf
T
1
T
T∑
t=1
µt(m)m.
A convenient feature of this utility specification for an infinitely patient government is that if µt(m)
converges, then the following two facts hold. First, U(m, 1) = µ∞(m)m where µ∞(m) is the limit
of µt(m). Second, U(m, δ) converges to U(m, 1) as δ goes to 1.
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2.3 Equilibrium Notion
In this paper we assume that all agents use Bayes rule to update their beliefs that the monetary
regime is soft.7 A behavioral strategy s = {st} for the agents together with a choice m of monetary
regime by the government determines the measures µt(m) of agents that enter the market in each
period t. An equilibrium of this game is then a pair (s∗,M∗) such that:
(i) Em[U(m, δ)|M∗(δ)] = sup{Em[U(m, δ)|M(δ)] | M : [0, 1] → ∆2 measurable} for almost all
δ ∈ [0, 1], where Em denotes expectation with respect to m and ∆2 is the unit simplex in R2;
(ii) V (s∗, θ) = sup{V (s, θ) | s is a behavioral strategy} for all θ ∈ [0, 1];
(iii) Agents behave in a sequentially rational way.
We restrict attention to equilibria where a positive measure of agents enters the market in every
period. This condition rules out the uninteresting non-monetary equilibrium where no agent ever
enters the market.
3 Agent’s Behavior
In this section we take the behavior of the government as given and study the agents’ behavior
when the number of market meetings is n. The agent’s problem is an example of a two-armed
bandit with one known arm.8 It is natural to look at such a problem as a Markovian decision
problem where the state, that we denote by θ, is the belief that m = mH and it changes through
Bayesian updating.
The way the θ changes is as follows. If at the beginning of a period t an agent chooses autarky,
θ does not change, as he receives no new information about the value of m. If, instead, he goes to
the market, his new updated belief is
B(c, θ) =
θmcH(1−mH)(n+1)−c
θmcH(1−mH)(n+1)−c + (1− θ)mcL(1−mL)(n+1)−c
,
where c ∈ {0, . . . , n + 1} is the number of meetings with money he faces. Note that since the
decision of the government does not change over time, it does not matter the order in which agents
with money are met, only the total number of those agents.
Let P denote the set of all probability measures on the (Borel sets of) the unit interval and let
N be the random variable denoting the possible number of meetings with money in one period of
7In the next section we see in detail how belief updating takes place.
8See Banks and Sundaram (1992) for a detailed discussion of multi-armed bandits.
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market trading. The probability an agent with belief θ assigns to the event N = c is
θPrH(N = c) + (1− θ)PrL(N = c), (1)
where N has a multinomial distribution with parameters mH or mL, depending on the whether
the regime is soft or tight, and n+ 1. Let pi(θ) be the probability distribution over {0, . . . , n+ 1}
induced by N and θ; that is, let pi(c|θ) be given by (1). From pi(θ) and B, we can then construct
the transition probability qn : [0, 1]→ P such that
qn(D|θ) =
∫
ID(B(θ, c))pi(dc),
where D is a measurable subset of [0, 1] and ID is the indicator function of this set. This transition
probability describes, for an agent with belief θ that goes to the market on a given period, the
distribution of his possible updated beliefs after facing the government and his n market meetings.
Let Wβ be the value function for an agent with discount factor β. Its corresponding Bellman
equation is then given by
Wβ(θ) = max
{
(1− β)
(
a+
a
n
)
+ βWβ(θ), (1− β)
(
v(θ) +
a
n
)
+ β
∫
Wβ(s)qn(ds|θ)
}
, (2)
where v(θ) = θv(mH)+(1−θ)v(mL)− an . If in a given period an agent with belief θ chooses autarky,
he gets a flow payoff of a + an and his belief stays the same. If instead he chooses the market, his
expected flow payoff is v(θ) + an and he updates his belief based on his market experience. Recall,
once more, the normalization of payoffs introduced in Section 2. In both cases he faces the same
market/autarky decision in the following period. Let Vβ(θ) = Wβ(θ) − a/n. Then (2) can be
rewritten as
Vβ(θ) = max
{
(1− β)a+ βVβ(θ), (1− β)v(θ) + β
∫
Vβ(s)qn(ds|θ)
}
.
From we now we use the above equation as the Bellman equation for the agents’ problem and Vβ
for his value function. We omit the dependence of Vβ on n until Section 5, where we study what
happens when we let n vary. The following proposition is a well-known result from the bandit
literature. Its proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. There exists, for each β ∈ (0, 1), a unique θG(β) ∈ (0, 1) such that an agent with
discount factor β always goes to the market if θ < θG(β) and always stays in autarky if θ > θG(β).
An interesting implication of this result is that even when the monetary regime is tight, and so
the market is objectively better than autarky, an optimizing agent may stay in the market only a
finite number of periods and already feel informed enough to drop out of the market for good.
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It is important to note that an optimal decision rule involves not only the comparison between
the agent’s expected flow payoff from entering the market and the flow payoff from staying in
autarky. It also takes into consideration the fact that by entering the market, the agent obtains
additional information about the monetary regime. To make this point more clear, consider the
optimal decision rule of a myopic agent (one that has β = 0). In this case, his decision to enter or
not in the market does not take into account any gains from experimentation and depends solely
on the comparison between flow payoffs. He enters as long as v(θ) ≥ a . Let θm be the unique
value of θ for which we have equality. Notice that θm is independent of n. It is possible to show
that θG(β) > θm for all β ∈ (0, 1) and all n > 1. Therefore, even when the flow expected payoff in
the market is smaller than in autarky, the benefits of obtaining additional information induce the
agent to choose the market. In other words, the option value of market experimentation is positive.
This also implies that θG(β) is increasing in β, as the more patient an agent is, the more he values
experimentation. The following result is proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. θG(β) > θm for all n > 1 and all β ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, θG(β) is increasing in β.
In particular, θG(β) ≤ θG(β) < 1 for all β ∈ [β, β].
Throughout the paper we assume, without loss of generality, that when indifferent between the
market and autarky, an agent always chooses the market. Since we restrict attention to equilibria
where a positive fraction of the population enters the market in every period no matter the monetary
regime, the only feasible equilibria have an agent with discount factor β entering the market if,
and only if, his belief is less or equal than θG(β). Therefore, in order for such equilibria to exist,
it is necessary to assume that θ0 < θG(β), so that at least in the first period a positive fraction of
the population enters the market.9 Moreover, we assume that θ0 ≥ θ0, where θ0 is a fixed positive
number, and so all agents put some probability on the event that the monetary regime is soft.10 In
Appendix B we see how such a lower bound for θ0 is determined.
4 Aggregate Behavior and Government’s Behavior
This section is divided in two parts. First we determine how the aggregate behavior of all agents
depends on the nature of the monetary regime. We show that if the monetary regime is soft, then
over time the fraction of agents accepting money and entering the market converges to zero. If,
instead, the monetary regime is tight, there is a positive measure of agents that always accepts
9This follows from the assumption that the distribution G of discount factors across the agents has a density.
10There is no equilibrium in which θ0 = 0. If this were the case, then the government would always choose m = mH ,
which contradicts the fact that θ0 = 0.
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fiat money and enters the market. It is this characterization result that allows us to determine
the government’s choice of monetary regime as a function of its discount factor. The study of the
government’s behavior is done in the second part.
4.1 Aggregate Behavior
Let µt(m) be the fraction of agents entering in the market in period t given that m is the amount
of money in circulation.11 We want to show that if θ0 ∈ [θ0, θG(β)), then
lim
t→∞µt(mH) = 0 and limt→∞µt(mL) > 0.
For each ht ∈ Ωt, an agent has a belief θ(ht) about the value of m. It is possible to construct
a random variable θt : Ω∞ → [0, 1] describing the distribution of period t beliefs for an arbitrary
agent.12 Therefore
ηt(m,β) = Pr{θt ≤ θG(β) |m}
is the probability that any agent with discount factor β enters the market in period t when the
monetary regime is m.13 Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the probability that an agent
faces a private history ht is equal to the measure of agents experiencing the history ht. This implies
that
µt(m) =
∫
ηt(m,β)g(β)dβ.
As autarky is an absorbing state, it is easy to see that both {ηt(mH , β)} and {ηt(mL, β)} are non-
increasing sequences. Hence the same is true of {µt(mL)} and {µt(mH)}, and so these fractions
must converge to some numbers in [0, 1], as they are bounded.
Let us first establish that for almost all β ∈ [β, β], limt→∞ ηt(mH , β) = 0. Suppose, by contra-
diction, that a positive measure of agents enters the market an infinite number of periods. If that
is the case, they learn the true value of m by the consistency of Bayes estimates for the multino-
mial distribution. See De Groot (1970). In particular, when m = mH , the belief of these agents
converges to one with probability one. Because an agent with discount factor β should always
choose autarky when his belief gets above θG(β), and θG(β) < 1 for β ∈ [β, β], we cannot have
both m = mH and a positive measure of agents entering the market an infinite number of periods.
Therefore, m = mH implies that with probability one any agent enters the market only a finite
11The fractions µt(m) also depend on θ0 and n. Since both are fixed for now, we omit this dependence.
12This construction is identical to the one from Easley and Kiefer (1988).
13Let γt(m, θ) = Pr{θt ≤ θ |m}. Then γt, as a function of θ, has a finite number of discontinuities. Hence it is a
Borel-measurable function of θ, as any function with a finite number of discontinuities can be written as the pointwise
limit of a sequence of continuous functions. Because θG(β) is monotonic in β, it is a Borel-measurable function of β.
Consequently ηt(m,β) = γt(m, θ
G(β)) is a Borel-measurable function of β.
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number of periods. Therefore it must be that limt→∞ ηt(mH , β) = 0 for almost all β ∈ [β, β], as we
wanted to show.
Now we make use of Theorem 5.1 in Banks and Sundaram (1992). It says that for any multi-
armed bandit problem with independent arms and finite type spaces, the following holds: If at
any point in time an arm is selected by an optimal strategy, then there exists at least one type of
this arm with the property that conditional on the arm’s type being this particular one, this arm
remains, with non-zero probability, an optimal choice forever after. In our setting, where the type
of the market arm is m, this implies that if an agent with discount factor β ∈ [β, β] enters the
market at some point in time, then there exists α(β) > 0 and m ∈ {mL,mH} such ηt(m,β) > α(β)
for all t. By hypothesis, there exists β′ < β such that if β ≥ β′, then θG(β) ≥ θ0. Moreover,
we know, from the previous paragraph, that ηt(mH , β) → 0 for almost all β ∈ [β, β]. Hence it
must be that for almost all β ∈ [β′, β], ηt(mL, β) > α(β) > 0 for all t ∈ N. We can then state the
following result, which is an immediate consequence of the Lebesgue bounded convergence theorem,
see Kolmogorov and Fomin (1970).
Proposition 3. Suppose θ0 ≤ θ0 < θG(β). Then lim
t→∞µt(mH) = 0 and limt→∞µt(mL) = µL > 0.
Therefore, even though it is true that overissued money can circulate in the economy in the short-
run, it gradually stops being used over time. Note that this process of overissue and abandonment
of paper money may take a long time if the private experience of an agent in the market (measured
by the number n of market meetings) is small. If, however, there is no overissue, a positive measure
of agents always accepts fiat money and step in the market.
4.2 Government’s Behavior
In the previous subsection we determined how the measures µt(m) evolve over time as a function
of the monetary regime when all agents in the economy follow the decision rule described by
Proposition 1. We now determine how the government’s decision is affected by these dynamics.
It is obvious that an infinitely patient government prefers a tight monetary regime to a soft one.
Suppose then that δ < 1. The government’s utility is
U(m, δ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1µt(m)m.
By choosing a soft monetary regime, the government enjoys a higher flow of utility in the first
several periods, when the agents are still relatively uninformed. The government knows, however,
that µt(mH) → 0 , and so its revenue from seignorage converges to zero. The alternative is to
choose m = mL. In this case, the revenue from seignorage, though smaller at the beginning, is
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bounded away from zero. Hence, a sufficiently patient government should choose m = mL, while
an impatient one should go with m = mH despite the fact that monetary trade collapses. We have
the following result. Its proof can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 4. Suppose θ0 ∈ [θ0, θG(β)). There exists a unique δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that U(mL, δ∗) =
U(mH , δ∗). Moreover, U(mL, δ) > U(mH , δ) if δ > δ∗ and U(mL, δ) < U(mH , δ) if δ < δ∗.
In other words, if the agents follow the cutoff belief rule described by Proposition 1, the gov-
ernment should follow a cutoff strategy as well: Choose mH if δ < δ∗ and mL if δ > δ∗, where
δ∗ ∈ (0, 1). From now on we adopt the convention that when indifferent between mL and mH , that
is, when δ = δ∗, the government chooses mL. Nothing that follows depends on this assumption.
To finish, notice that δ∗ depends on θ0 and n.
5 Information Transmission
The purpose of this section is to study how n, the number of market meetings, affects the behavior
of the government. This requires us to change slightly our notation, as we now need to make
explicit the dependence of both the agents’ and the government’s problem on n. As such, we
denote the individual agent value functions of Section 3 by Vβ,n and the corresponding cutoff
beliefs by θG(β, n). We also need to consider how the payoffs to the agents and the government
depend on the (common) prior θ0. For this reason, the fractions of agents entering the market are
now µt(mL, n; θ0) and µt(mH , n; θ0), and the government’s payoff is U(m, δ, n; θ0).
The normalization of the agents’ payoffs introduced in Section 2 implies that they are in utils
per number of market meetings. Therefore changing n changes only the degree of information
transmission in the market, not the market’s gain or loss relative to autarky. Specifically, as n
increases, going to the market becomes more informative, and so the agents learn faster about the
nature of the monetary regime. Our intuition would then suggest that a soft monetary regime breaks
down in a shorter amount of time, thus reducing the incentives to overissue for any government.
It turns out that the above intuition is broadly correct, but not entirely accurate, and the reason
is that changing n also affects the behavior of the agents. If the informational content of the market
increases, the option value of trying it increases as well. In other words, the cutoff beliefs θG(β, n)
should be increasing in n for all β ∈ (0, 1). The first result that we establish is that θG(β, n) is
indeed an increasing function of n, but it is bounded away from one.
To see why θG(β, n) must be bounded away from one, consider the hypothetical case where the
number of market meetings is infinite. If an agent with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) and belief θ enters
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the economy, his flow payoff is
v∞(θ) = (1− β)[θmH(1−mH) + (1− θ)mL(1−mL)]u.
Moreover, he learns the true amount of money in circulation. Given that before entering the market
he expects the monetary regime to be soft with probability θ, his overall payoff from doing so is
then
(1− β)v∞(θ) + β [a+ (1− θ)mL(1−mL)u] .
If we let Vβ,∞ be the value function for this problem, then the corresponding Bellman equation is
Vβ,∞(θ) = max {(1− β)a+ βVβ,∞(θ), (1− β)v∞(θ) + β [a+ (1− θ)mL(1−mL)u]} . (3)
The optimal decision rule for an agent is still a cutoff strategy, where the cutoff belief θG(β,∞)
is the unique solution to
a = (1− β)v∞(θG(β,∞)) + β
[
θG(β,∞)a+ (1− θG(β,∞))mL(1−mL)u
]
.
In particular, we cannot have θG(β,∞) = 1, given that v∞(1) = mH(1 − mH)u < a, and so
θG(β,∞) < 1 for all β ∈ (0, 1). Since the option value of entering the market is highest when
n = ∞, as the informational gain is the biggest possible, we must then have θG(β, n) < θG(β,∞)
for all β ∈ (0, 1) and all n ∈ N, and this implies the desired result. It is possible to give a more
rigorous justification for the above argument. It is a corollary to the following lemma.
Proposition 5. For all β ∈ (0, 1), {Vβ,n} is a non-decreasing sequence that converges uniformly
to Vβ,∞ as n→∞.
Corollary 1. For all β ∈ (0, 1), θG(β, n) is non-decreasing in n and supn≥2 θG(β, n) < 1.
Corollary 1 implies the following result: As long as θ0 < supn≥2 θG(β, n) then, as n increases
to infinity, µt(mH , n) converges to zero and µt(mL, n) converges to one for all t ≥ 2. From this we
get our next result. Its proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 6. Let δ = (mH −mL)/mH and fix θ0 with θ0 < θ0 < supn≥2 θG(β, n). Then, for all
δ > δ, there exists n(δ) such that U(mL, δ, n; θ0) ≥ U(mH , δ, n; θ0) if θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ0] and n ≥ n(δ).
Notice that (1−δ)mH is a lower bound on the payoff a government with discount factor δ obtains
when it chooses a soft monetary regime. If the same government chooses a tight monetary regime,
an upper bound for its payoff is mL. Therefore, no matter the number n of market meetings, a
government with discount factor δ < δ always chooses m = mH .
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6 Equilibrium
Here we bring together the results from the previous sections and establish the two main results of
the paper. First, that for all n ≥ 2 there are equilibria where a positive measure of agents is in the
market in all periods and agents and the government follow the cutoff strategies of Propositions 1
and 4, respectively. In fact, these are the only equilibria where a positive measure of agents is in
the market in all periods. Second, that as n increases, the cutoff discount factor of the government
in all these equilibria approaches δ, the lowest cutoff discount factor possible.
Fix the number of market meetings, suppose the government’s strategy is given by a function
M : [0, 1]→ ∆2, and let θ0 be the ex-ante probability of a tight monetary regime. The cutoff belief
strategy described in Proposition 1 is, for any given agent, the unique best response to any profile of
behavioral strategies by the other agents with the property that a positive measure of agents enters
the market in all periods. It is, moreover, sequentially rational as a consequence of the principle
of optimality for dynamic programming. Section 4 shows that if all agents follow the cutoff belief
strategy described by Proposition 1, then, as long as θ0 < θG(β, n), their aggregate behavior implies
that the unique best response for the government is a cutoff discount factor strategy. Let δ∗(θ0, n)
denote this cutoff discount factor. Unfortunately this is not enough to guarantee the existence of an
equilibrium with the desired properties. We need to deal with the following consistency problem:
Consistency Problem: If the government follows a cutoff discount factor strategy with cutoff
δ∗(θ0, n), the agent’s common prior that the monetary regime is soft is given by F (δ∗(θ0, n)). How
do we know that θ0 = F (δ∗(θ0, n))? In other words, how do we know that the agent’s common
prior belief about the nature of the monetary regime is justified. We need to determine if the maps
Θn that take θ0 into F (δ∗(θ0, n)) have, for all n ≥ 2, a fixed point. Moreover, we need to ensure
that for each n, Θn has at least one fixed point lying in the interval [θ0, θG(β, n)), for otherwise the
analysis conducted so far breaks down.
In Appendix B we show that there are conditions on F ensuring that the maps Θn constructed
above have, for each n ≥ 2, a fixed point θ0 in the desired interval. This establishes the first main
result of this paper. Since the argument of Appendix B relies on Brower’s fixed point theorem,
there is no reason to expect uniqueness for fixed F and n ≥ 2. An interesting possibility in case
there is multiplicity of equilibria is that there may be a range of discount factors for the government
where its choice of monetary regime differs across equilibria. The verification of this fact, however,
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Proposition 7. For all n ≥ 2, there exist equilibria where a positive measure of agents enters the
market in all periods. Moreover, all such equilibria have the government following the cutoff strategy
described by Proposition 4 and the agents following the cutoff strategy described by Proposition 1.
The the self-fulfilling priors θ0(n) corresponding to these equilibria lie in [θ0, θG(β, n)).
This proposition describes how a utility maximizing government acts in an environment where
agents can only form beliefs from their private experiences. A crucial aspect is that the govern-
ment has a degree of freedom to choose the monetary regime that does not exist when there is
full information. If agents know with certainty which government is acting in the economy, the
only equilibrium involving monetary trade has m = mL. However, with partial information, the
government can overissue money and still operate for some time.
A consequence of this result is that incomplete information can bring instability to trade in-
volving money. For the monetary system to be stable, the government must have incentives to keep
money valuable over a long period of time. These incentives depend on the government’s discount
factor δ and the number n of per-period market meetings. Since the economy has no mechanism
that fully reveals the government’s policy, society has to rely on the possibility that the government
is sufficiently patient. The second main result of this paper shows that the government’s incentives
to overissue decrease when n increases. It is an immediate consequence of Propositions 6 and 7.
Proposition 8. For all δ > δ there exists n(δ) such that if n ≥ n(δ), the equilibria of Proposition
7 are such that the cutoff discount factor of the government is less than δ.
It seems reasonable to suggest that in modern economies the dissemination of information about
decisions made by the government is much faster than in the past. We model this change as in
increment in the number of opportunities an agent has to gather information about the state of the
economy. This increment is interpreted here as an increase in n. Therefore, as a result of the above
proposition, we expect that in modern societies the incentives of any government to overissue are
less pronounced than in the past.
7 Comments
We make a number of assumptions that deserve some comment. We assume that money and goods
are indivisible and there is an upper bound on money holdings. Moreover, we assume that the
government can only choose two levels of m. Finally, once the government chooses m, it is not
allowed to change it. We begin with this last issue.
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7.1 Time Consistency
Consider an environment where the government makes an once and for all injection of money at the
beginning of time. In this economy, the decision of whether to stay in the market or go to autarky
depends on more than just the belief about the government’s behavior. It also depends on an agent’s
money holdings. Agents with the same belief may behave differently depending on whether they
carry money or not. As a result, conditional on the government’s choice, the distribution of money
holdings across the population changes over time, and so the choice between market and autarky
cannot be time-independent. It turns out that working with such an environment is considerably
more difficult, and it brings no new insights as far as the government’s behavior is concerned. We
would still have the same trade-off between overissuing and the eventual breakdown of trade.
We avoid the above problem by structuring the market and the government in such a way
that the fraction of agents with money, conditional on the choice of monetary regime, does not
change over time. This makes our model tractable. This modelling choice, however, brings out
the issue of whether the government’s behavior is time consistent. In other words, would the
equilibria described in Proposition 7 still be equilibria of the game where the government can now
choose at the beginning of every period the amount m ∈ {mL,mH} of money to put in circulation?
Unfortunately no, for reasons brought forth by the literature on Reputation.14
Here is a very brief and informal explanation of why the type of equilibrium we consider does not
survive. Suppose it does, and take a government that chooses a tight monetary regime. Eventually,
a period t is reached where almost all agents entering the market are nearly convinced that m = mL.
What happens in t if instead of choosing mL, this government chooses mH? Any agent in the market
that is nearly convinced that the monetary regime is tight attributes any negative experience
(meeting someone else with money) to bad luck. Therefore virtually all of the agents that entered
the market in period t reenter the market in the following period. This means that the government
under consideration has an incentive to deviate, a contradiction. In a nutshell, in the environment
considered in this paper no government has an incentive to maintain a reputation of being patient.
In a related paper, Araujo and Camargo (2005), we show how to modify our environment in
a way that preserves the equilibria of Proposition 7 and the analysis that follows from it. This
is done by introducing some exogenously driven uncertainty: In every period a fraction λ of the
population dies and is replaced by newly born agents that are uncertain about the nature of the
monetary regime. If λ is neither too high nor too low, this perpetual renewal of uncertainty induces
on patient governments an incentive to build and maintain a reputation of being patient, so that
they always choose a tight monetary regime.
14See Mailath and Samuelson (1998), for example.
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7.2 Indivisibility
In our economy, an agent’s experience in a given meeting is important as it allows him to make
inferences about the government’s behavior. This experience has two components: The money and
good holdings of his partner and the outcome of the trade process between them. When we assume
that both money and goods are indivisible, and there is an upper bound on money holdings, the
money holdings of the agent’s partner become the only relevant piece of information for him. This
implies a very simple exchange process. More importantly for our purposes, it greatly simplifies
the updating of beliefs while still capturing in a natural way the idea that agents learn from their
private histories. If goods and/or money were divisible, we would have to specify how trade between
agents depends on private histories. The analysis would become more complex and, given our goals,
would not necessarily generate additional insights.15
7.3 The Choice of m
It is possible to work with a model where the government can choose among a finite number of
different monetary regimes. In the end, however, what matters for the agent is not the exact amount
of money in circulation, but whether it is best for him to enter the market or stay in autarky. In
this sense, a model where the government is constrained to choose among two different levels of
money supply, one where the market is better than autarky and another where it is worse, captures
the relevant idea. Hence there seems little gain from studying the more complex case.
8 Conclusion
This paper addresses in a formal way the determinants of monetary stability in a decentralized
economy where fiat money is endogenously created, information about its value is imperfect, and
learning is decentralized. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to put together these
features. We believe they constitute a reasonable model if one wants to analyze the instability of
fiat money as observed throughout history. In particular, by assuming that learning only takes
place over time, we are able to induce dynamics on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles
the historical accounts on the rise and eventual demise of overissued paper money.
We show that the government’s temptation to overissue is limited in two different ways. First, it
depends on its commitment in maintaining the long-run value of money, here given by its patience.
This result goes along with Ritter (1995), who emphasizes that patience is a key condition in
15Examples of papers that address learning from private histories when goods are divisible are Katzman, Keenan
and Wallace (2003) and Araujo and Shevchenko (2004).
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the transition from a barter to a fiat money economy. Second, it depends on society’s ability
to monitor the government’s behavior, modelled by the number of transactions an agent faces in
a given period. The ability to collect information, and the consequent stability it induces, has
changed over time. More precisely, in modern economies, information flows much faster than in
the past. This reasoning offers an explanation for the late widespread use of fiat money, despite its
clear advantages.
We restricted attention to the government as the sole provider of money. However, our analysis
can also offer insights into scenarios where a private agent issues notes that circulate in the economy.
Consider, for example the U.S. banking experience in the 19th century. King (1983) explains the
overissue of circulating notes during this period by arguing that “(...) holders of circulating notes
are unlikely to closely monitor the activities of a note issuer, because notes represent a small fraction
of an individual’s wealth and are held only for a brief period.” (p.136). Our paper offers a potential
environment where the likelihood of an overissue of circulating notes can be formally addressed.
For instance, assume that the reasons underlying the demand for information (the ratio of money
holdings to wealth, or the length of time an individual holds a note, for example) are relatively
invariant, but that the technology that supplies information improves over time. Our analysis then
suggests that the probability of an overissue, and the consequent necessity of imposing stringent
controls over the creation of notes, reduces as the economy evolves.
A Sections 3, 4, and 5
Proposition 1 There exists, for each β ∈ (0, 1), a unique θG(β) ∈ (0, 1) such that an agent with
discount factor β always goes to the market if θ < θG(β) and always stays in autarky if θ > θG(β).
Proof: Let I = [0, 1] and B(I) be the set of all real-valued, bounded, and measurable functions
defined on I endowed with the sup-norm. Observe that B(I) is a complete metric space. Consider
the map T defined on B(I) such that
Tf(θ) = max
{
(1− β)a+ βf(θ), (1− β)v(θ) + β
∫
f(s)qn(ds|θ)
}
for all f ∈ B(I). It is easy to see that if f is measurable, then∫
f(s)qn(ds|θ) =
n+1∑
c=0
f(B(c, θ))[θPrH(N = c) + (1− θ)PrL(N = c)]
is also measurable. In fact, if f(θ) is continuous, then
∫
f(s)qn(ds|θ) is also continuous; that is, the
transition probabilities qn have the Feller property. Since v is continuous, T maps B(I) into itself.
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A straightforward argument shows that T is a contraction. Therefore it has a unique fixed point
V ∗ in B(I) by the Banach fixed point theorem.
We now establish, in two steps, a property of V ∗ that leads to the desired result. First,
suppose that f ∈ B(I) is non-increasing and let θ1 > θ2. Because B(c, θ) is increasing in θ
for all c ∈ {0, . . . , n+ 1},∫
f(s)qn(ds|θ1)−
∫
f(s)qn(ds|θ2) ≤ (θ1 − θ2)
n+1∑
c=0
f(B(c, θ2))[PH(N = c)− PrL(N = c)]. (A.1)
Let pik, with k ∈ {L,H}, be the probability distribution on {0, . . . , n + 1} induced by N and the
choice k of monetary regime. Since mH > mL, it is easy to see that
d
dc
(
PrH(N = c)
PrL(N = c)
)
=
d
dc
(
mH
mL
)c(1−mH
1−mL
)n+1−c
> 0.
Therefore, as a consequence of MLRP, piH first-order stochastically dominates piL. We can then
conclude, as B(c, θ) is decreasing in c for all θ ∈ [0, 1], that the term on the right-hand side of (A.1)
is non-positive. In other words, ∫
f(s)qn(ds|θ)
is non-decreasing in θ if f is. A useful corollary of this result is that V ∗ is non-increasing in θ.
The fact established in the previous paragraph together with the same argument used in the
proof of Lemma 1 in Kakigi (1983) lead to the following result: T has the property that if f ∈ B(I)
is such that
(1− β)a+ βf(θ)− (1− β)v(θ)− β
∫
f(s)qn(ds|θ) (A.2)
is non-decreasing in θ, then Tf is such that
(1− β)a+ βTf(θ)− (1− β)v(θ)− β
∫
Tf(s)qn(ds|θ)
is strictly increasing in θ. Therefore, once more by standard arguments, V ∗ is such that (A.2) is
strictly increasing in θ. Since
(1− β)a+ βV ∗(0) < (1− β)v(0) + β
∫
V ∗(s)qn(ds|0)
and
(1− β)a+ βV ∗(1) > (1− β)v(1) + β
∫
V ∗(s)qn(ds|1),
we can then conclude that there exists a unique θ ∈ [0, 1], that we denote by θG(β), such that
(1− β)a+ βV ∗(θ) = (1− β)v(θ) + β
∫
V ∗(s)qn(ds|θ).
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Moreover, θG(β) is interior and it satisfies V ∗(θG(β)) = a.
Because the action space is finite, the problem of the agents has an optimal decision rule. The
value function Vβ is the conditional expected reward from one such decision rule when the agent’s
discount factor is β. From Blackwell (1965), we know that Vβ is bounded and measurable, and
that it satisfies (2). Hence Vβ = V ∗. From the previous paragraph and the principle of optimality,
we then have the desired result: For all θ < θG(β), the market is chosen, and for all θ > θG(β),
autarky is chosen.
Proposition 2 θG(β) > θm for all n > 1 and all β ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, θG(β) is increasing in β.
In particular, θG(β) ≤ θG(β) < 1 for all β ∈ [β, β].
Proof: Let us first establish that θG(β) > θm for all n > 1. For this fix n > 1 and let f0 be given
by f0(θ) = v(θ). Since f0 is linear,
Tf0(θ) = (1− β) max{a, v(θ)}+ βf0(θ) ≥ f0(θ)
for all θ ∈ [0, 1], where T is the operator introduced in the proof of the previous proposition. Let
f1 = Tf0. Since v(θm) = a by definition,∫
f1(s)qn(ds|θm) > (1− β) max{a, v(θm)}+ βf0(θm) = f1(θm).
Therefore Tf1(θm) > f1(θm). Now let fk = T kf0 , with k ∈ N. Since T is monotonic, fk ≥ fk−1 for
all k. Moreover, T kf0 converges uniformly to Vβ. Because uniform convergence implies pointwise
convergence, we can then conclude that Vβ(θ) ≥ f0(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1] and Vβ(θm) > f0(θm).
From the previous proposition we know that Vβ(θG(β)) = a. Consequently Vβ(θG(β)) = f0(θm) <
Vβ(θm), and so θG(β) > θm, as Vβ is non-decreasing.
To prove the second part of the theorem, let S = [0, 1]× [β, β] and B(S) be the set of all real-
valued, bounded, and measurable functions defined on S endowed with the sup-norm. Consider
now the map Q : B(S)→ B(S) such that
Qf(θ, β) = max
{
(1− β)a+ βf(θ, β), (1− β)v(θ) + β
∫
f(θ, β)qn(ds|θ)
}
.
It is straightforward to show that Q is a contraction, so that it has a unique fixed point in B(S),
given that this set is a complete metric space. Denote it by V ∗∗. Now let B be the subset of B(S)
such that if f ∈ B, then f is non-decreasing in β and f(θ, β) ≥ max{a, v(θ)} for all (θ, β) ∈ S.
Then B is a closed subset of B that is mapped into itself by Q. Standard arguments show that
V ∗∗ ∈ B. Since V ∗∗(θ, β) = Vβ(θ) for all β ∈ [β, β], we can then conclude that Vβ is non-decreasing
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in β. To finish, note that since Vβ(θG(β)) = a, then θG(β) is the unique solution to
a = (1− β)v(θ) + β
∫
Vβ(s)qn(ds|θ).
Because the right-hand side of the above equation is increasing in β and decreasing in θ, we have
the desired result.
Proposition 4 Suppose θ0 ∈ [θ0, θG(β)). There exists a unique δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that U(mL, δ∗) =
U(mH , δ∗). Moreover, U(mL, δ) > U(mH , δ) if δ > δ∗ and U(mL, δ) < U(mH , δ) if δ < δ∗.
Proof: Let G(δ) be given by
G(δ) = U(mL, δ)− U(mH , δ) =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1dt,
where dt = µt(mL)mL − µt(mH)mH . We want to show that there exists a δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
G(δ) < 0 if δ < δ∗ and G(δ) > 0 if δ > δ∗. First observe that
G(k)(δ) :=
dkG
dδk
(δ) =
∞∑
t=k+1
(t− 1)(t− 2) . . . (t− k)δt−k−1dt.
By Proposition 3, µt(mL) converges to some µL > 0 while µt(mH) converges to zero. Hence there
exists t
′ ≥ k + 1 such that if t ≥ t′ , then dt ≥ 14µLmL, so that
G(k)(δ) ≥
t
′−1∑
t=k+1
(t− 1) . . . (t− k)δt−k−1dt + µL4
∞∑
t=t′
(t− 1) . . . (t− k)δt−k−1.
Since the first term after the above inequality is finite for all δ, we can conclude then that
limδ→1− G(k)(δ) = +∞ for all k ≥ 0. Let now t be the smallest integer such that dt ≥ 0 for
all t ≥ t. Such a t exists because of the asymptotic behavior of the population measures in the two
monetary regimes. Since
G(t−1)(δ) =
∞∑
t=t
(t− 1) . . . (t− t+ 1)δt−tdt,
we have that G(t−1)(δ) > 0 for all δ. Notice that we cannot have t = 1, since this would imply that
U(mL, δ) > U(mH , δ) for all δ ≥ 0, which is not true for δ sufficiently close to zero.
So, suppose that t > 1. Now observe that
G(t−2)(δ) =
∞∑
t=t−1
(t− 1) . . . (t− t+ 2)δt−t+1dt = (t− 2) . . . 2dt−1 +
∞∑
t=t
(t− 1) . . . (t− t+ 2)dt,
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and so G(t−2)(0) < 0. Since G(t−2) is strictly increasing and G(t−2)(1−) = +∞, we have that there
exists a unique δ1 such that G(t−2)(δ) < 0 if, and only if, δ < δ1. If t = 2, we are done, just set
δ = δ1. So, suppose now that t > 2. The same reasoning as above shows that G(t−3)(0) < 0. Since
G(t−3)(δ) decreases until δ1, and after this point it increases strictly to +∞, we have that there
is a unique δ2 > δ1 such that G(t−3)(δ) < 0 if, and only if δ < δ2. If t = 3, we are again done.
Otherwise, we continue with this process. Since t is finite, it eventually reaches an end.
Proposition 5. For all β ∈ (0, 1), {Vβ,n} is a non-decreasing sequence that converges uniformly
to Vβ,∞ as n→∞.
Proof: (1) Fix β ∈ (0, 1), and let Tn be, for each n > 1, the map introduced in the proof of
Proposition 1. In other words, Tn : B[0, 1]→ B(I) is the map such that
Tnf = max
{
(1− β)a+ βf(θ), (1− β)v(θ) + β
∫
f(s)qn(ds|θ)
}
.
Then Vβ,n is, for each n > 1, the unique fixed point of Tn in B(I). A standard argument shows
that the functions Vβ,n are in fact continuous, as the transition probabilities qn satisfy the Feller
property. By Lemma 3.1 in Banks and Sundaram (1992), we also have that they are convex.
(2) Let C∞[0, 1] = ×∞i=1C[0, 1] and endow this space with the product topology. Then {Vβ,n} is a
fixed point of the map Γ : C∞[0, 1]→ C∞[0, 1] such that (Γf)n(θ) = Tnfn(θ) for all n > 1.
Let d : C∞[0, 1]×C∞[0, 1]→ R+ be such that
d(f, g) = max
n
cnpn(f − g)
1 + pn(f − g) ,
where pn(f) = ||fn||sup and {cn} is some strictly positive sequence of real numbers such that cn
converges to zero. For example, we can take cn = 2−n. One can show that d is a metric on C∞[0, 1]
and that it metrizes the product topology on C∞[0, 1]. Since the product of a countable number
of complete metric spaces is also complete, we have that (C∞[0, 1], d) is a complete metric space.
(3) We now prove that Γ is a contraction with respect to d, so that {Vβ,n} is its unique fixed point in
C∞[0, 1]. For this suppose, by contradiction, that there is no δ < 1 such that d(Γf,Γg) ≤ δd(f, g).
So, for all n ∈ N, there exists j(n) ∈ N such that
cj(n)||Tfj(n) − Tgj(n)||sup
1 + ||Tfj(n) − Tgj(n)||sup
>
(
1− 1
n
)
max
k
ck||fk − gk||sup
1 + ||fk − gk||sup
≥
(
1− 1
n
)
cj(n)||fj(n) − gj(n)||sup
1 + ||fj(n) − gj(n)||sup
.
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This implies that
||Tfj(n) − Tgj(n)||sup − β||fj(n) − gj(n)||sup
dj(n)
>
(
1− 1
n
− β
) ||fj(n) − gj(n)||sup
dj(n)
− 1
n
||Tfj(n) − Tgj(n)||sup||fj(n) − gj(n)||sup
dj(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ej(n)
,
where dj = (1 + ||Tfj − Tgj ||sup)(1 + ||fj − gj ||sup). But {ej(n)} is a bounded sequence, and so
1
nej(n) must converge to zero. Since 1 − 1n − β converges to 1 − β > 0, we then have that if n is
sufficiently large, the right-hand side of the above inequality is positive. Hence, if we take n large
enough,
||Tfj(n) − Tgj(n)||sup > β||fj(n) − gj(n)||sup,
which contradicts the fact that ∀j ∈ N the map fj 7→ (Γf)j = Tjfj is a contraction of modulus β.
Consequently Γ is a contraction in C∞[0, 1], as we wanted to prove.
(4) Let X = {f ∈ C∞[0, 1] : {fn} is uniformly convergent} and suppose that {fm} is a sequence
in X such that converges to f . We want to show that f ∈ X, that is, that f = {fn} is a uniformly
convergent sequence. From the definition of d we know that if {fm} is convergent in C∞[0, 1], then
{fmn } is uniformly convergent in C[0, 1] for all n, and it must converge to fn. Now observe that for
all θ ∈ [0, 1],
fn1(θ)− fn2(θ) = fn1(θ)− fmn1(θ) + fmn1(θ)− fmn2(θ) + fmn2(θ)− fn2(θ),
where the choice of m is arbitrary, so that
|fn1(θ)− fn2(θ)| ≤ ||fn1 − fmn1 ||sup + ||fmn1 − fmn2 ||sup + ||fmn2 − fn2 ||sup.
Take  > 0. Since, by hypothesis, {fmn } is uniformly convergent for all m, we know that there exists
N such that if n1, n2 ≥ N , then ||fmn1 − fmn2 ||sup < /3 . Take then n1, n2 greater than N . Because
{fmn1} and {fmn2} converge uniformly to fn1 and fn2 , respectively, there is m0(n1, n2) ∈ N such that
if m ≥ m0, then ||fn1 − fmn1 ||sup < /3 and ||fmn2 − fn2 ||sup < /3. If we now take m ≥ m0 , we can
conclude that |fn1(θ)− fn2(θ)| <  for all θ ∈ [0, 1]; that is, ||fn − fn′ ||sup <  . Consequently {fn}
is Cauchy, and so uniformly convergent. This proves that X is indeed a closed subset of C∞[0, 1].
Now let Y = {f ∈ C∞[0, 1] : fn is convex for all n} ∩X. As with X, we need to show that Y is
a closed subset of C∞[0, 1] . For this suppose that {fm} is a convergent sequence in Y with limit
f ∈ C∞[0, 1] that is not convex. This means that there exist q ∈ N, θ, θ′ ∈ [0, 1], and λ ∈ (0, 1)
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such that fq(λθ + (1− λ)θ′) > λfq(θ) + (1− λ)fq(θ′). Now observe that
λfq(θ) + (1− λ)fq(θ′)− fq(λθ + (1− λ)θ′) = λfq(θ) + (1− λ)fq(θ′)− λfmq (θ)− (1− λ)fmq (θ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
am
+ λfmq (θ) + (1− λ)fmq (θ′)− fmq (λθ + (1− λ)θ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bm
+ fmq (λθ + (1− λ)θ′)− fq(λθ + (1− λ)θ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cm
.
Since fm → f , we know (from the previous paragraph) that fmq → fq uniformly for all q ∈ N,
and so it must be that am, cm → 0. By hypothesis, we know that bm ≥ 0 for all m. Moreover,
the sequence {bm} is bounded above, since {fm} is convergent. Hence {bm} has a convergent
subsequence. Without loss of generality, assume that {bm} itself is convergent and denote its limit
by α. We know that α ≥ 0, and so the right-hand side of the above equality converges to a
non-negative number, a contradiction. Hence Y is also closed, since X is.
Finally, let W = {f ∈ C∞[0, 1] : fn ≤ fn+1 for all n} ∩Y. As above, we want to show that this
set is closed. For this, suppose that {fm} is a sequence in W that converges to f ∈ C∞[0, 1], but
there are q ∈ N and θ ∈ [0, 1] for which fq+1(θ) < fq(θ). Since
fq+1(θ)− fq(θ) = fq+1(θ)− fmq+1(θ) + fmq+1(θ)− fmq (θ) + fmq (θ)− fq(θ),
an argument similar to the one from the previous paragraph shows that the right-hand side of
the above inequality has a subsequence converging to a non-negative real number, which is a
contradiction. Therefore W is closed, since Y is.
(5) We now show that Γ maps W into itself, so that standard arguments allow us to conclude
that {Vβ,n} ∈ W. Suppose that f ∈ W. From Lemma 3.1 in Banks and Sundaram (1992), we
know that if fn is convex, then Tfn also is. Since qn+1(θ) is a mean-preserving spread of qn(θ), we
have that qn+1(θ) second-order stochastically dominates qn(θ). Therefore, since fn+1 is convex by
assumption, ∫
fn+1(s)qn+1(ds|θ) ≥
∫
fn+1(s)qn(ds|θ).
But fn+1 ≥ fn by assumption as well, and so we also have that (Γf)n+1 ≥ (Γf)n. To finish we
prove that {(Γf)n} is uniformly convergent. For this, let f∞ be the uniform limit of {fn}, and let
Tf∞(θ) = max {(1− β)a+ βf∞(θ), (1− β)v(θ) + β[θf∞(1) + (1− θ)f∞(0)]} .
Since max{g, h} −max{m,n} ≤ max{g −m,h− n}, we have that
|Tfn(θ)− Tf∞(θ)| ≤ max
{
0, β
[∫
fn(s)qn(ds|θ)− θf∞(1)− (1− θ)f∞(0)
]}
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It is possible to show that the consistency of the Bayes estimator for an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli
trials implies that for all θ ∈ [0, 1], qn(θ) converges in the topology of weak convergence of prob-
ability measures to θδ(1) + (1 − θ)δ(0). Here δ(x) is the Dirac measure with mass on x. Hence,
by the same argument used by Easley and Kiefer (1988) in the proof of their Lemma 1, we know
that
∫
fn(s)qn(ds|θ)→ θf∞(1) + (1− θ)f∞(0) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently {Tfn} is a sequence
of continuous functions defined over a compact set that converges pointwise and monotonically to
Tf . By Dini’s theorem, see Rudin (1976), {Tfn} is uniformly convergent. We can then conclude
that Γ maps W into itself.
From (5) we have the desired result: {Vβ,n} is a non-decreasing sequence of functions that converges
uniformly to Vβ,∞.
Corollary 1 For all β ∈ (0, 1), θG(β, n) is non-decreasing in n and supn≥2 θG(β, n) < 1.
Proof: We first prove that θG(β, n) is increasing in n. From Lemma 5 we know that∫
Vβ,n+1(s)qn+1(ds|θ) ≥
∫
Vβ,n(s)qn(ds|θ)
for all n > 1. Since θG(β, n) is the unique solution to
(1− β)v(θ) + β
∫
Vβ,n(s)qn(ds|θ) = a,
it must be that θG(β, n) cannot decrease with n, as the left-hand side of the above equation is
non-decreasing in n and non-increasing in θ. This follows from the proof of Proposition 1.
Let us now prove that supn>1 θG(β, n) < 1 for all β ∈ (0, 1). Fix β ∈ (0, 1) and suppose not.
Since {θG(β, n)} is a bounded and non-decreasing sequence, we know that it must converge to
θG(β,∞) = supn>1 θG(β, n). By assumption, we have that θG(β,∞) = 1. Now observe that
Vβ,n(θG(β, n)) = (1− β)v(θG(β, n)) + β
∫
Vβ,n(s)qn(ds|θG(β, n)) = a.
Since {Vβ,n} converges uniformly to {Vβ,∞}, we have that limn→∞ Vβ,n(θG(β, n)) = Vβ,∞(1). In
fact, the sequence {Vβ,n} is an equicontinuous set, see Rudin (1976). An /2 argument then implies
that Vβ,n(θG(β, n)) converges to V (1) as n → ∞. We also know, from the previous lemma, that∫
Vβ,n(s)qn(ds|θ) converges to θVβ,∞(1) + (1 − θ)Vβ,∞(0) for all θ. Moreover, from the previous
paragraph, this convergence is monotonic. Hence, by Dini’s theorem, we have that if hn(θ) =∫
Vβ,n(s)qn(ds|θ), then hn converges uniformly to h(θ) = θVβ,∞(1) + (1− θ)Vβ,∞(0). Consequently,
see the last footnote, hn(θG(β, n))→ h(θG(β,∞)) = h(1), and so
a = Vβ,n(θG(β, n))→ (1− β)v(θG(β,∞)) + βa < a,
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a contradiction. It must then be that θG(β,∞) < 1, the desired result.
Proposition 6 Let δ = (mH −mL)/mH and fix θ0 with θ0 < θ0 < supn≥2 θG(β, n). Then, for all
δ > δ, there exists n(δ) such that U(mL, δ, n; θ0) ≥ U(mH , δ, n; θ0) if θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ0] and n ≥ n(δ)
Proof: Suppose that δ > δ = (mH −mL)/mH . First notice that for all t ≥ 2, µt(mL, n; θ0) → 1
and µt(mH , n; θ0) → 0 as n → ∞. Now let  = mL − (1 − δ)mH > 0. Since µ2(mH , n, θ0) → 0,
there exists n1(δ) such that if n ≥ n1(δ), then
µ2(mH , n, θ0) ≤
(1− δ)
4mHδ
.
Moreover, since µt+1(mH , n; θ0) ≤ µt(mH , n, θ0) for all t and n, we have, in fact, that the above
inequality holds for all t ≥ 2. Therefore,
U(mH , δ, n; θ0) ≤ U(mH , δ, n; θ0) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1µt(mH , n; θ0)mH < (1− δ)mH +

4
whenever n ≥ n1(δ). We now need to find an appropriate lower bound for U(mL, δ, n; θ0). For this,
let n2(δ, t) be such that if n ≥ n2(δ, t), then
µt(mL, n; θ0) > 1− 4NmLδt−1 ,
where N is such that (1 − δN+1)mL − (1 − δ)mH + 2 > 0. We know that such an N exists by
hypothesis. Now let n2(δ) = max{n2(δ, t) | t = 2, . . . , N}. If n ≥ n2(δ),
U(mL, δ, n; θ0) ≥ U(mL, δ, n; θ0) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1µt(mL, n; θ0)mL > (1− δN+1)mL − (1− δ) 4 .
Hence, if n ≥ n(δ), where n(δ) = max{n1(δ), n2(δ)}, then,
U(mL, δ, n; θ0)− U(mH , δ, n; θ0) > (1− δN+1)mL − (1− δ)mH − 2 > 0,
for all θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ0], and so our claim is proved.
B Equilibrium
Here we show that there are conditions on the distribution function. F that ensure that the maps
Θn defined in Section 6 have, for all n ≥ 2, a fixed point in the interval (0, θG(β, n)). The key part
of the argument is to find uniform (in n) bounds on the possible cutoff discount factors for the
government. We begin with a lower bound.
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We know, from Section 5, that if δ ≤ δ, where δ = (mH − mL)/mH , then the government
always chooses mH no matter n. In other words, no cutoff discount factor δ∗ can be smaller than δ.
Therefore, a lower bound for the common prior is F (δ), and for this reason we set θ0 = F (δ). Our
first assumption about F is that θG(β, n) > F (δ) > 0 for all n ≥ 2. It implies that all agents put
positive probability on the monetary regime being soft. At the same time this probability is not
too high to discourage the most optimistic of them from choosing the market in the first period.
Since, by Corollary 1, θG(β, n) is increasing in n, the above condition is satisfied for all n > 1 as
long as it is satisfied for n = 2.
We now find an upper bound δ < 1 for the possible cutoff discount factors that is independent
of n. For this, suppose that θ0 ≤ θ0 < θG(β, 2). For example, we can set θ0 = θm, the myopic
cutoff belief. We need the following auxiliary results.
Proposition 9. Let {xnt} be an infinite double sequence such that: (i) For each n ∈ N, there
exists x∞(n) such that {xnt}∞t=1 converges monotonically to x∞(n); (ii) There exists x∞ such that
limn→∞ xnt = x∞ for all t ∈ N; (iii) x∞(n)→ x∞ as n→∞. Then limt→∞ supn∈N |xnt−x∞(n)| =
0.
Proof: Let N = N ∪ {∞} and consider the function d : N× N→ R such that
d(m,n) =
∣∣∣∣ 1m − 1n
∣∣∣∣ ,
where, by definition, 1/n = 0 when n = ∞. Then d is a metric on N. Let us show that N, when
endowed with d, is a compact metric space. Suppose {An}∞n=0 is an open cover of N. Then, for all
i ∈ N there exists ni ∈ N ∪ {0} such that ∞ ∈ An0 and i ∈ Ani for i ∈ N. Since d(m,∞) → 0 as
m→∞, we know there exists m0 ∈ N such that m ∈ Am0 if m ≥ m0. Therefore An0 , An1 , . . . , Anm0
is a finite subcover of {An}, and so (N, d) is indeed a compact metric space.
Now let, for each t ∈ N, ft : N → R be such that: (i) For t ∈ N, ft(n) = xnt if n ∈ N and
ft(∞) = x∞; (ii) f∞(n) = x∞(n) for all n ∈ N. Since for each t ∈ N, ft(n) converges to x∞ as
n → ∞, we have that the functions ft are continuous for all t ∈ N.16 Moreover ft(n) ↓ f∞(n) for
each n ∈ N as t → ∞. Therefore, {ft}∞t=1 is a sequence of continuous functions that converges
pointwise on a compact metric space to a continuous function f∞. By Dini’s theorem, see Rudin
(1976), we then have that {ft} converges uniformly to f∞. In other words, supn∈N |ft(n)−f∞(n)| =
supn∈N |xnt − x∞(n)| → 0 as t→∞, which implies the desired result.
16The continuity of the functions ft at the other points of N is immediate.
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Proposition 10. The following two facts hold:
(i) There exists γ > 0 such that U(mL, δ, n; θ0) ≥ γ for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ0] and all n > 1;
(ii) limδ→1 sup
{
U(mH , δ, n; θ0) | n > 1 and θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ0]
}
= 0.
Proof: Write ηt(m,β, n; θ0) to denote the dependence of the probabilities ηt of Section 3 on both
n and the prior θ0. Because ηt is non-increasing in θ0 and non-decreasing in β, we have that
µt(mL, n; θ0) ≥
∫
ηt(mL, β, n; θ0)g(β)dβ ≥
∫
ηt(mL, β′, n; θ0)g(β)dβ = αηt(mL, β′, n; θ0),
where β′ = inf{β : θG(β, 2) ≥ θ0} < β and α =
∫
[β′,β] g(β)dβ > 0. Since, from Section 3,
inft ηt(mL, β′, n, θ0) = η∞(n) > 0 for all n ≥ 2, we then have that µt(mL, n; θ0) ≥ αη∞(n) > 0 for
all t ∈ N and all n ≥ 2. Notice that this lower bound depends on our choice of θ0, but the latter
can be made (and indeed is) independent of n. Moreover, η = infn≥2 η∞(n) > 0.17 Therefore, for
all θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ0] and all δ ∈ [0, 1), we have that
U(mL, δ, n; θ0) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1µt(mL, n, θ0) ≥ γ > 0,
where γ = αη is independent of n. The same lower bound holds for U(mL, 1) for the reasons
pointed at the end of Section 2.
Now observe that µt(mH , n; θ0) ≤ ηt(mH , β, n;F (δ)) for all t ∈ N, n ≥ 2, and θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ0]; that
is, the fraction of the population entering the market in period t when m = mH is not bigger than
the corresponding probability for the most initially optimistic and patient agents. Consequently,
U(mH , n, δ; θ0) ≤ sup
n≥2
{
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ηt(mH , β, n;F (δ))mH
}
≤ (1− δ)
{ ∞∑
t=1
δt−1 sup
n≥2
ηt(mH , β, n;F (δ))mH
}
for all θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ0] and all n ≥ 2. By Corollary 1, we know that supn≥2 θG(β, n) < 1, and so, since
F (δ) > 0 , limn ηt(mH , β, n;F (δ)) = 0 for all t ∈ N. Therefore, as a consequence of Lemma 9 ,
we have that supn≥2 ηt(mH , β, n;F (δ)) converges to zero as t→∞. Hence, the right-hand side of
the above inequality converges to zero as δ goes to one. We can then conclude that U(mH , n, δ; θ0)
converges to zero as δ → 1 uniformly in n and θ0, the desired result.
This last lemma implies that there exists 1 > δ > δ such that if δ ≥ δ, then U(mL, n, δ; θ0) ≥
U(mH , n, δ; θ0) for all θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ0] and all n > 1. In other words, δ is the desired upper bound for
17This is a consequence of the fact that there exists n0 ∈ N such that η∞(n) > η∞(2) for all n ≥ n0.
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the possible cutoff discount factors for the government. Notice that δ is independent of n and the
c.d.f. F . The latter is true since the cutoff beliefs θG(β, n) are independent of F . This brings us
to our second assumption about F , namely, that F (δ) ≤ θ0.
Summarizing, the only possible cutoff discount factors for the government lie in the interval
[δ, δ], no matter the number n > 1 of market meetings. The two assumptions made above ensure
that if Θn has a fixed point, then it must lie in [θ0, θ0] ⊂ (0, θG(β, 2)). The final result in this
appendix shows that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 11. For all n ≥ 2, the maps Θn have a fixed point.
We need to following result before we can prove the above lemma.
Proposition 12. For each n ≥ 2, U(m,n, δ; θ0) is jointly continuous in δ and θ0 if for all t ∈ N,
µt(m,n; θ0) is a continuous function of θ0.
Proof: Suppose that for all t ∈ N, µt(m,n; θ0) is a continuous function of θ0. Then U(m,n, δ; θ0)
is, for all δ ∈ [0, 1], a continuous function of θ0. Since each µt is monotonic in θ0, U is monotonic
in θ0 as well. Moreover, for all θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ0], U is continuous in δ. We can then apply Lemma 2 in
Dutta et. al. (1994) to conclude that U is indeed jointly continuous in θ0 and δ.
Proof of Lemma 11: We know that for each θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ0] and n ≥ 2, δ∗(θ0, n) is the unique solution
to the equation U(mL, δ, n; θ0) = U(mH , δ, n; θ0). Hence, if we show that both U(mL, n, δ; θ0) and
U(mH , n, δ; θ0) are jointly continuous in δ and θ0 for all n ≥ 2, the same is true of δ∗(θ0, n). Because
the c.d.f. F associated with f is a continuous function as well, this implies that the maps Θn are
all continuous. The existence of a fixed point for each one of them then follows from Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem together with the fact that they map the interval [θ0, θ0] into itself.
By Lemma 12, the only thing we need to do is show that for each t ∈ N and n ≥ 2, both
µt(mL, n; θ0) and µt(mH , n; θ0) are continuous functions of θ0. For this, suppose {θk0} is an infinite
sequence such that θk0 → θ0. This implies that for each t and n ≥ 2, ηt(m,β, n; θk0)→ ηt(m,β, n; θ0)
for almost all β ∈ [β, β].18 By Egorov’s theorem, see Kolmogorov and Fomin (1970), almost
everywhere pointwise convergence implies convergence in L1. Therefore
µt(m,n; θk0) =
∫
ηt(m,β, n; θk0)g(β)dβ → µt(m,n; θ0) =
∫
ηt(m,β, n; θ0)g(β)dβ
for all t and n ≥ 2, and so we have the desired continuity result.
18We know the fractions ηt(m,β, n; θ0) are not necesssarily continuous in θ0, as there may be one or more private
histories that, given θ0, leave an agent indifferent between the market and autarky for at least one period t
′ ≤ t. If
that is the case, perturbing θ0 induces a discontinuous change in this fraction. However, for each t and n, the number
of priors θ0 at which this can happen is finite, and so of Lebesgue measure zero.
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